Political Implications
Electoral Reform in the United States: Proposals for Combating Polarization and Extremism
In Chapter 2, Edward B. Foley shows that the system of partisan primaries followed by plurality-winner general elections used widely in the United States is especially susceptible to overrepresentation of partisan extremism when the electorate itself is highly polarized and voters are relatively far from the electorate’s median. The kind of system adopted in Alaska can help considerably to counteract the election of extreme candidates. However, as polarization of the electorate intensifies, the ability of Instant Runoff Voting to avoid the election of extremists is reduced dramatically. Foley shows that the only effective method of substantial depolarization is to adopt some form of most-preferred voting, which includes head-to-head voting.
“The Real Preference of Voters”: Madison’s Idea of a Top-Three Election and The Present Necessity of Reform
Edward B. Foley shows that James Madison comprehended and embraced Condorcet’s insights on the mathematics of majority rule in a letter describing a Condorcet-based electoral system. If adopted, elections would put into effect what Madison himself termed “the real preference of the Voters.” Foley asserts that such a system would protect Madisonian democracy from the threat of an authoritarian demagogue who is able to prevail currently by first winning a partisan primary and then being more popular than the opposing party’s nominee.
The Fairest Vote of All
In this article published by Scientific American, Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin show that while there is no such thing as a perfect voting system, a system that uses head-to-head voting permits a more accurate representation of voters’ view. Head-to-head voting more often avoids the flaws that arise for other voting methods and, significantly, could be easily implemented in the United States and in countries around the world. Read more by Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen in The Rules of the Game: A New Electoral System published by The New York Review of Books.
The Constitution and Condorcet: Democracy Protection through Electoral Reform
Edward B. Foley argues that the U.S. Constitution’s electoral framework must evolve to better defend democracy against authoritarian threats, and he proposes incorporating Condorcet-based voting systems, like head-to-head voting, to do so. He shows that traditional plurality and even Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) can allow authoritarian populists to win despite lacking majority support, while systems like head-to-head better reflect the will of majorities and are more resistant to manipulation. As a result, Top 3 + Head-to-Head has potential to uphold democratic legitimacy by ensuring leaders are broadly preferred and truly accountable to majorities of voters.
Robust Electoral Competition: Rethinking Electoral Systems to Encourage Representative Outcomes
American democracy is suffering from declining electoral competition, with increasingly polarized candidates and unresponsive governance. Using both theoretical modeling and empirical data, Nathan Atkinson and Scott Ganz show that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)—despite its popularity—fails to address the core issue: a lack of strong incentives for candidates to appeal to the majority of voters. Instead, they propose a form of Condorcet Voting, like head-to-head voting, which ensures that the candidate preferred in all head-to-head matchups wins, restoring robust competition, motivating moderation, and enabling third-party candidates with broad appeal to succeed when major parties drift too far from the center.